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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2020 was eventful for Texas franchise law. Relevant opinions
this year featured nuanced and technical jurisdictional analysis, a range of
unique but recurring procedural issues, cases probing the limits of the
franchise relationship, disputes involving the enforceability of intellectual
property, and common remedies for common law and statutory claims.
While not all of these judgments yield novel holdings—with many recit-
ing precedents and applying doctrines familiar to franchise law practition-
ers in this state—they collectively provide a timely and salient update on
the state of franchise law in Texas.
II. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Hegar v. Mahindra USA, Inc.,1 Mahindra USA, Inc. (Mahindra), a
distributor of farm tractors and accessories, had a franchise tax dispute
with the Texas Comptroller (Comptroller) and Texas Attorney General
(collectively, the State). Following an audit by the Comptroller, the State
sought $569,380.06 in additional franchise taxes, penalties, and interest
for tax years 2008–2011.2 Mahindra sought administrative review chal-
lenging the tax deficiency on two fronts: (1) whether Mahindra qualified
as a wholesaler entitled to a lower 0.5% tax rate, and (2) whether Mahin-
dra’s “Sales Incentives” should be added to the cost of goods sold for
purposes of calculating the tax.3 On December 19, 2016, prior to the ad-
ministrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision, Mahindra also sought to apply
for reapportionment of its sales apportioned to Texas as opposed to other
jurisdictions.4 On March 1, 2017, the ALJ issued its proposed decision,
finding in favor of the Comptroller on the first two issues and further
concluding that the reapportionment claim “was submitted more than
four years after the franchise tax was due for the latest report year” and
was therefore untimely.5 The Comptroller adopted the ALJ’s decision on
May 5, 2017, and denied Mahindra’s motion for rehearing on June 2,
2017. “Mahindra submitted $654,060.31 as payment of the tax, penalties,
1. No. 03-18-00126-CV, 2020 WL 962415, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 28, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
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and interest,” and then sued the State on June 30, 2017, seeking “[r]efund
of [t]ax [p]aid under [p]rotest.”6 The State responded to the lawsuit by
filing a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Mahindra’s claim for a refund
was untimely.7 The trial court disagreed, denying the State’s plea to the
jurisdiction.8 The State appealed the denial.9
As the Third Austin Court of Appeals explained, a plea to the jurisdic-
tion is a fundamental challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion and is reviewed de novo—with no deference to the trial court’s
findings, reasoning, or judgment.10 The procedural facts in this case were
not disputed; the decisive issue on appeal was whether—under § 112.052
of the Texas Tax Code—Mahindra’s apportionment claim was a refund
made in protest or whether it was a claim in a separate tax suit.11 The
court of appeals agreed with the State that Mahindra’s claim for a refund
was an independent suit and therefore untimely.
The court reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, the court
noted that “a prerequisite to bringing a protest payment suit” is that the
protesting party “must submit with the payment a protest.”12 Mahindra
submitted a protest with its payment following the Comptroller’s adop-
tion of the ALJ’s proposed decision in June 2017 but had not raised the
allocation issue as a protest in its initial payment of the disputed franchise
tax in 2013. Second, § 112.051 permits a protest payment where the pro-
testing party “is required to pay a tax or fee imposed by this title or col-
lected by the comptroller under any law . . . .13 In this case, Mahindra’s
stated basis for the allocation payment was its own erroneous federal in-
come tax filings. While erroneously paid taxes are recoverable as a con-
ventional tax refund claim, they are not recoverable “as a refund request
in a protest payment suit.”14
Because Mahindra failed to meet the statutory prerequisites for a pro-
test payment suit, the only remaining basis for subject matter jurisdiction
was a tax refund suit governed by another section of the Texas Tax Code,
§ 112.151, which is, in turn, governed by a six-month limitations period
under § 111.104(c).15 Mahindra waited until December 2016, three years
after the Comptroller completed its audit—and well after the limitations
period had expired for its tax refund claim—to raise the apportionment
issue during the ALJ proceeding.16 Therefore, the trial court lacked juris-
6. Id. at *3–4.




11. Id. at *5.
12. Id. at *6 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.051(a)).
13. Id. (quoting TEX. TAX CODE § 112.051(a)).
14. Id.
15. Id. at *6–7 (citing TEX. TAX CODE § 112.151(a)) (“A claim for refund must: . . . be
filed before the expiration of the applicable limitation period as provided by this code or
before the expiration of six months after a jeopardy or deficiency determination becomes
final, whichever period expires later.” (quoting TEX. TAX CODE § 111.104(c)(3))).
16. Id. at *8.
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diction over Mahindra’s claim—either as “a protest payment suit or a tax
refund suit”—and the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of
the State’s plea to the jurisdiction, dismissing Mahindra’s apportionment
claim for want of jurisdiction.17
Whereas Hegar addressed subject matter jurisdiction in the context of
statutory claims under state law, Arruda v. Curves International, Inc. in-
volved federal subject matter jurisdiction over both state and federal
claims.18 Multiple franchisees (Plaintiffs) entered into franchise agree-
ments with defendants Curves International and Curves NA (collectively,
Curves) and later sued Curves, alleging that Curves concealed relevant
information about the franchise system from current and prospective
franchisees and also breached its franchise agreements with Plaintiffs.19
Following an initial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint by Curves,
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.20 Curves moved to dismiss the
amended complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims were inadequately
pled.21 The decisive issue in the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas’s review of Curves’ motion to dismiss was whether Plaintiffs
had standing to bring a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) claim. That RICO claim served as the jurisdictional
foothold for the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, without which
the district court would not have been able to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims.22 In other words, if the RICO claim
was dismissed, the district court might not have been able to reach the
merits of any of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims.
As the district court noted at the outset of its analysis, the RICO stat-
ute creates a private cause of action to recover damages from an enter-
prise whose conduct demonstrates “a pattern of racketeering activity.”23
In order to sufficiently allege racketeering activity, Plaintiffs were re-
quired to allege two or more predicate criminal acts that are related and
evince a threatened or continued pattern of criminal activity.24 The Ar-
ruda Plaintiffs alleged that Curves violated the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act (FTCA) by failing to notify current and prospective franchisees
of an “Operating Blueprint.” This document was an internal document
based on a marketing study in which Curves and its co-defendants
planned to “prune 1,000+ unsustainable locations” from its franchise sys-
tem in an effort to prevent widespread closures of existing Curves
franchises at an annual rate of over 15%.25 While Plaintiffs conceded that
17. Id.
18. Arruda v. Curves Int’l, Inc., No. 6:20-CV-00092-ADA, 2020 WL 4289380, at *8
(W.D. Tex. July 27, 2020) (discussed infra Section VI.A regarding statutory claims), appeal
filed, No. 20-50734 (5th Cir. 2020).
19. Id. at *1.
20. Id. at *2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *8.
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id. (citing Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007)).
25. Id. at *1, *4.
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the FTCA’s disclosure requirements did not provide a private cause of
action, they argued that Curves’ violations of the FTCA’s disclosure rules
could support a RICO action for mail or wire fraud.26
The district court disagreed, concluding that: (1) federal courts agree
that there is no private cause of action under the FTCA; (2) “Plaintiffs
could not rely on alleged violations of the FTCA to give rise to a common
law state-law claim for fraud because under Texas law franchise relation-
ships do not give rise to confidential or fiduciary duties”; (3) even if the
FTCA rule provided a basis for a RICO action, Plaintiffs failed to allege
the “predicate crimes of mail and wire fraud . . . with the adequate partic-
ularity”; and (4) notwithstanding the foregoing deficiencies common to
all Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs who signed their franchise agreements prior to the
completion of the “Operating Blueprint” lacked standing to bring a
RICO action because they could not show prejudice from the lack of dis-
closure by Curves.27
After dispatching the viability of Plaintiffs’ RICO claim for fraud, the
district court turned to the issue of whether it could exercise jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.28 Because Curves and at least two of
the plaintiffs were domiciled in Texas, diversity jurisdiction was unavail-
ing, and the district court needed to weigh whether supplemental jurisdic-
tion over the state-law claims was appropriate after dismissing the sole
federal RICO claim.29 While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a fed-
eral district court’s decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claims after dismissing all federal-law claims “is purely discre-
tionary,” the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly held that a “dis-
trict court abuse[s] [this] discretion [by] retaining jurisdiction over . . .
state law claims after . . . dismiss[ing] [a] federal RICO claim.”30 Specifi-
cally, the Fifth Circuit’s holding reflected concern that federal judicial
economy is uniquely susceptible to “widespread abuse of civil RICO [ac-
tions],” and that it “does not seem unreasonable to require that a party
risk losing its state claims if it insists upon bringing a groundless RICO
claim.”31 In accord with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Parker, the district
26. Id. at *4.
27. Id. at *3–8. The district court’s holding that FTCA disclosure requirements did not
create a confidential or fiduciary relationship is consistent with broader trends in Texas and
federal case law discouraging private rights of action under the FTCA. See, e.g., Crim
Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992); Mor-
rison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1996).
28. Arruda, 2020 WL 4289380, at *8.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *8–9. Compare Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)
(“A district court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims] after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discre-
tionary.”), with Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 590 (5th
Cir. 1992) (“After considering and weighing all the factors present in this case, we thus
conclude that the district court, with the admirable intention of moving its docket, abused
its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims after it had dismissed the
federal RICO claims.”).
31. Arruda, 2020 WL 4289380, at *9 (quoting Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 927
F.2d at 588).
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court in Arruda dismissed Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims without
prejudice after ruling that Plaintiffs failed to state a viable RICO claim
for mail or wire fraud.32
While the facts in Hegar and Arruda are distinct, both cases demon-
strate the importance of subject matter jurisdiction as an essential prereq-
uisite for adjudicating the merits of the parties’ claims and defenses.
Hegar concerned statutory causes of action in which the state court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction was wholly dependent on the plaintiff following
specific procedures for bringing claims under the Texas Tax Code. Arruda
demonstrated more general statutory limits on the ability of federal
courts—as courts of limited jurisdiction—to exercise supplemental juris-
diction over state-law claims in the absence of complete diversity. With-
out a viable RICO claim to sustain federal question jurisdiction and
attendant supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, the
federal court was required to dismiss all claims. These cases illustrate the
importance of subject matter jurisdiction as a dispositive threshold issue
in any lawsuit. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties
or by the courts—it is fundamental to a court’s authority to adjudicate a
dispute—and a dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction could per-
manently prejudice the parties’ abilities to refile claims at a later date.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
In Gigi’s Cupcakes, LLC v. 4 Box LLC,33 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas dismissed all claims against co-defendants
Gina Butler (Butler) and Alan Thompson (Thompson)—co-founders of
the Gigi’s Cupcakes franchise—on the basis that the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over Butler and Thompson.34 Butler and Thompson
were sued in their individual capacities, along with the Gigi’s Cupcakes
entity, by franchisees alleging that Butler and Thompson made fraudulent
misrepresentations or omissions to franchisees in connection with a sys-
tem-wide mandate to switch to a new food supplier.35 Butler and Thomp-
son moved to dismiss all claims against them for lack of personal
jurisdiction, arguing that, as citizens of Tennessee, they lacked sufficient
ties to Texas to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction.36
The district court began its analysis by noting that there was no dispute
that neither Butler’s nor Thompson’s contacts with Texas were “substan-
tial, continuous, and systematic” enough to warrant the exercise of gen-
eral personal jurisdiction.37 Regarding the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction, the key factors to consider were: “(1) whether Butler and
32. Id. at *8–9.
33. No. 3:17-CV-3009-B, 2020 WL 1064852, *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2020). Haynes and
Boone attorneys Deborah Coldwell, Aimee Furness, and Sally Dahlstrom represent Gigi’s
Cupcakes, LLC and certain of its affiliates in this matter.
34. Id. at *8.
35. Id. at *1.
36. Id. at *2.
37. Id. at *3.
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Thompson have minimum contacts with Texas; (2) whether the franchis-
ees’ causes of action arise out of or result from Butler and Thompson’s
forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion is fair and reasonable.”38 If the plaintiff-franchisees satisfied their
burden to show that the first two factors were satisfied, the burden would
shift to Butler and Thompson “to show that exercising jurisdiction would
be unfair or unreasonable.”39
The plaintiff-franchisees alleged three specific groupings of contacts
Butler and Thompson shared with Texas: (1) each had entered into multi-
ple franchise agreements with Sugar On Top—a Texas-based fran-
chisee—in 2011 and 2013, and each was personally involved in litigation
with Sugar On Top in Texas state court; (2) Butler and Thompson exe-
cuted agreements in their personal capacities in connection with the ac-
quisition of the Gigi’s Cupcakes franchise system by KeyCorp, LLC—a
Texas entity; and (3) Butler and Thompson continued to be employed as
consultants by entities associated with the franchisor.40 As a preliminary
matter, the district court agreed with Butler and Thompson that their
connections to Sugar On Top—a nonparty franchisee—were insufficient
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a Texas court.41 Regard-
ing their involvement with the KeyCorp acquisition and their continued
employment relationship with entities affiliated with the current
franchisors, the district court further concluded that the plaintiff-franchis-
ees failed to allege a nexus between those Texas connections and the spe-
cific claims of fraud at issue in this lawsuit.42 Because the plaintiff-
franchisees failed to allege that the fraudulent misrepresentations by But-
ler and Thompson arose out of or related to any of the three specific cate-
gories of Texas-based contacts, and because plaintiff-franchisees failed to
allege that further discovery would serve to establish personal jurisdic-
tion, the district court dismissed all claims against Butler and Thompson
for want of personal jurisdiction.43
A similar issue arose in the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals in
Kumon North America Inc. v. Ngoc Vinh Nguyen.44 In that case, the
plaintiff (Nguyen) alleged that she slipped and fell in a math and reading
center, Kumon Math and Reading Center of Rosenberg (the Center),
which was owned and operated by a franchisee, Paramount Investments
LLC (Paramount).45 Rather than sue Paramount, Nguyen sued the
franchisor, Kumon North America Inc. (Kumon), a Delaware corporation
38. Id. (citing Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir.
2006)).
39. Id. (citing Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2014)).
40. Id. at *4.
41. Id. at *5.
42. Id. at *5–6.
43. Id. at *7–8.
44. No. 14-18-00639-CV, 2020 WL 3527615, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
June 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
45. Id.
78 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 7
with its principal place of business in New Jersey.46 Kumon made a spe-
cial appearance challenging the Texas trial court’s personal jurisdiction
and appealed the trial court’s denial of that special appearance.47 On ap-
peal, Nguyen argued that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was consti-
tutional because Kumon was doing business in Texas as an alter ego of
Paramount—its Texas-based franchisee.48
In order to comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice—as required by constitutional due process—Nguyen had to show
that Kumon established minimum contacts by “purposely avail[ing] itself
of the privilege of conducting activities” in Texas.49 Specifically, with re-
gard to an alter ego theory of jurisdiction, Nguyen had to show that
Kumon exerts “such domination and control over its subsidiary that they
do not in reality constitute separate and distinct corporate entities but are
one and the same corporation for purposes of jurisdiction.”50 In support
of jurisdiction, Nguyen argued that Paramount was an alter ego of
Kumon because Kumon controlled “the name of the business, hours of
operation, fee structure, corporate structure, location, advertising, certain
operating procedures, and instructional measures of the Center” under
the terms of its franchise agreement.51 Nguyen further argued that
Kumon was amenable to jurisdiction because it “was doing business in
Texas” and “had a registered agent for service of process” in the state.52
Kumon responded by arguing that it did not own the Center, and that
Paramount had control over the “day-to-day operations” of the Center,
including hiring, training, and supervising employees, and maintaining the
Center in a safe condition.53
The court of appeals ultimately agreed with Kumon, noting that
“Nguyen has pointed to no authority showing that Kumon and Para-
mount had more than a typical franchisor and franchisee relationship[ ] in
which the franchisor controls certain aspects of the franchise to maintain
the quality of its brand and consistency among franchises.”54 Not only
was there insufficient evidence that Kumon’s connections were substan-
tial enough to confer general personal jurisdiction, but none of Nguyen’s
claims related to her slip-and-fall injuries arose out of Kumon’s specific
contacts with Texas or its franchisor-franchisee relationship with Para-
mount.55 Because Nguyen’s claims arose from “the unilateral activity of
Paramount”—the entity “solely responsible for hiring, training, [and] su-
pervising” employees and maintaining the Center in a safe condition—
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id. at *2 (quoting PHC-Minden, LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 173
(Tex. 2007)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id. at *2–3.
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id. at *3–4.
2021] Franchise Law 79
the court of appeals concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over
Kumon, reversing the trial court and rendering judgment against Nguyen
for want of jurisdiction.56
JTH Tax, LLC v. Butschek57 involved a more straightforward applica-
tion of personal jurisdiction analysis involving one of multiple defendants
in a franchise dispute. The plaintiff in this case (JTH) was a franchisor
that terminated its relationship with defendants Kenneth and Theresa
Butschek (the Butscheks), the owners of six franchised tax preparation
businesses.58 While a separate suit for breach of the franchise agreements
was proceeding in federal court in Virginia, JTH also sued the Butscheks
and their daughter, Katherine Osterhus (Osterhus), in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas for trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.59
While there was no dispute that the district court had personal jurisdic-
tion over the Butscheks as owners and operators of the Texas-based tax
preparation businesses at the center of the lawsuit, Osterhus moved to
dismiss the claims against her for want of personal jurisdiction, arguing
that she was a citizen of Colorado and had insufficient ties with Texas to
satisfy the minimum contacts standard for specific personal jurisdiction.60
In support of the exercise of jurisdiction, JTH pointed to the undis-
puted fact that Osterhus had applied for and received six Electronic
Filer’s Identification Numbers (EFINs) from the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) for each of her parents’ tax businesses.61 JTH argued that by
filing for and maintaining those EFINs, “Osterhus represented to the IRS
that she was the sole proprietor of the businesses and had responsibility
for ensuring that the businesses complied with IRS provisions” and was
therefore “avail[ing] herself of the benefits and protections of Texas.”62
In response, the Butscheks maintained that Osterhus had not worked or
received wages or profits from the tax businesses since 2006, and that
Osterhus merely applied for the EFINs for her parents’ businesses to
avoid a $5,000.00 fee to change the registration.63 While the Butscheks
contemplated transferring ownership of their businesses to Osterhus
when they eventually retired, they argued that she had no present interest
in the ownership or operation of any of the Texas-based tax businesses.64
The district court ultimately agreed with Osterhus and the Butscheks,
concluding that Osterhus’s EFIN filings were “even less availing of the
State of Texas than contracting with a Texas resident, which does not es-
56. Id. at *4–5.
57. No. 6:20-CV-26, 2020 WL 5083523, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *1.
64. See id.
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tablish minimum contacts.”65 Because Osterhus received no benefits
from the state of Texas in filing the EFINs with the federal government,
and because Osterhus had no further interaction with or control over her
parents’ businesses during the relevant time period, the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Osterhus and dismissed all claims
against her.66
Like subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is often a thresh-
old issue affecting a court’s ability to reach the merits of a dispute. Partic-
ularly, in complex litigation involving multiple parties with operations
spread across several states, defendants will frequently dispute specific
personal jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss, thereby requiring judges to
engage in “minimum contacts” analyses similar to those employed by the
courts in the Gigi’s Cupcakes, Kumon, and Butschek opinions. While per-
sonal jurisdiction can be waived by parties and is not fundamental to a
court’s authority to hear a case, it is a critically important and ever-evolv-
ing component of a modern litigation practice, and practitioners on both
sides of the “v.” are well advised to never take personal jurisdiction for
granted. For defense counsel, an early motion to dismiss for want of per-
sonal jurisdiction can provide relatively quick and inexpensive relief for a
client. For plaintiffs’ counsel, a failure to establish personal jurisdiction
over a defendant at the outset of a lawsuit can lead to an embarrassing
early dismissal, or worse, protracted and costly motion practice on issues
completely unrelated to the merits of plaintiffs’ substantive claims.
B. CHOICE OF LAW
In JTH Tax LLC v. White,67 another former tax business franchisee
(White) was sued by its franchisor (JTH)—doing business as “Liberty Tax
Service”—for breach of contract and trademark infringement and dilu-
tion. The parties had previously executed a Mutual Termination Agree-
ment, which terminated White’s franchise license and purported to
absolve all parties of their obligations under the franchise agreement,
with the exception of post-termination obligations, which were expressly
memorialized in the Mutual Termination Agreement.68 Prior to reaching
the merits of JTH’s claims, the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas noted that Virginia law would apply to JTH’s breach of
contract claims, while Texas law—as the law of the forum—applied to the
remaining trademark claims.69 As the district court explained, the origi-
nal franchise agreement contained a choice-of-law provision specifying
65. Id. at *4 (“It is clearly established that ‘merely contracting with a resident of the
forum state does not establish minimum contacts.’” (citing McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d
753, 760 (5th Cir. 2009))).
66. Id.
67. No. 6-20-CV-00140-ADA, 2020 WL 3843691, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2020) (dis-
cussed infra Sections IV.A.1, VII.B regarding unauthorized use of trademarks and injunc-
tive relief).
68. Id.
69. Id. at *2 n.1, *5.
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that “Virginia law governs all claims that in any way relate to or arise out
of this Agreement or any of the parties hereto . . . .”70 Despite the fact
that the Mutual Termination Agreement effectively terminated all provi-
sions of the original franchise agreement—including the choice-of-law
provision—without expressly reiterating that the Mutual Termination
Agreement was also subject to Virginia law, the district court concluded
that the choice-of-law provision in the original franchise agreement still
governed JTH’s contract claims.71
C. FORUM SELECTION
In FranLink, Inc. v. BACE Services, Inc.,72 a franchisor (FranLink)
sued former franchisees (BACE Services) and additional parties (the
Non-Signatory Defendants) for trademark infringement and breach of
non-compete and non-solicitation provisions in the parties’ franchise
agreement. The Non-Signatory Defendants moved to dismiss FranLink’s
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The Non-
Signatory Defendants argued that they did not sign the franchise agree-
ment between FranLink and BACE Services and were, therefore, not
bound to the agreement’s forum selection clause. FranLink argued in re-
sponse that the Non-Signatory Defendants were closely involved with
BACE Services and “availed themselves of the benefits of the Franchise
Agreement.”73
As the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas explained
in its opinion, “[a] non-signatory to a contract containing a forum selec-
tion or jurisdiction waiver clause may be bound by the clause if that non-
signatory is ‘closely related to the dispute such that it becomes foresee-
able that it will be bound.’”74 Furthermore, both the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit and several district courts in Texas have
recognized a range of circumstances in which a non-signatory can be
bound by arbitration clauses and other forum selection clauses.75 Taking
FranLink’s allegations as true—as the district court must when assessing
a motion to dismiss—the district court concluded that the Non-Signatory
Defendants’ conduct was closely related to BACE Services and “inextri-
cably intertwined with the dispute.”76 Specifically, the district court was
persuaded by FranLink’s allegations that: “(1) prior to the termination
70. Id. at *2 n.1.
71. Id.
72. No. 4:19-CV-04593, 2020 WL 6600017, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2020).
73. Id. at *2.
74. Id. at *3 (quoting D.B. Inc. v. Nat’l Admin. Sols. Corp., No. 3-03-CV-2189-R, 2004
WL 865842, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2004)).
75. Id. (first citing Hellenic Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas, 464 F.3d 514, 517
(5th. Cir. Sept. 7, 2006); then citing Red Barn Motors Inc. v. Nextgear Capital, Inc., No. 13-
00778-BAJ-RLB, 2014 WL 4986674, at *5–6 (M.D. La. Sept. 29, 2014); then citing Excel
Mktg. Sols., Inc. v. Direct Fin. Sols., LLC, No. 3:11-CV-0109-D, 2011 WL 1833022, at *6
(N.D. Tex. May 13, 2011); then citing Alt. Delivery Sols., Inc. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons,
No. SA05CA0172-XR, 2005 WL 1862631, at *15–16 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2005); and then
citing Tex. Source Grp., Inc. v. CCH Inc., 967 F. Supp. 234, 237 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 1997)).
76. Id.
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[of] the Franchise Agreement,” one of the Non-Signatory Defendants
had offered services to a client of FranLink’s; (2) BACE Services’s former
franchised business and the Non-Signatory Defendants’ business were
“one and the same[,]” and both were invoicing FranLink’s clients for
staffing services using time sheets bearing FranLink’s trademarks; (3) one
of the Non-Signatory Defendants was an employee of another one of the
Non-Signatory Defendants; and (4) that all of the Non-Signatory Defend-
ants were “aware of the Franchise Agreement and its terms.”77
Thus, the district court held that the Non-Signatory Defendants were
bound by the forum selection clause in the franchise agreement; despite
the fact that they were not parties to the agreement, their close business
relationship with the franchisee while the agreement was in effect meant
that they “effectively consented to jurisdiction” in the Houston Division
of the Southern District of Texas.78
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In E.S. v. Best Western International, Inc.,79 the plaintiff (E.S.) was a
sex trafficking victim that alleged that she was trafficked for commercial
sex between 2006 and 2011 at hotels throughout Dallas and Fort Worth,
Texas.80 E.S. sued both the franchise owners and franchisors of the hotels
where she was trafficked under the William Wilberforce Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA). Regarding her
claims against the franchisors—specifically Best Western and Wynd-
ham—E.S. alleged that they were liable under § 1595 of the TVPRA,
which requires a claimant to allege that a defendant “(1) ‘knowingly ben-
efit[ted] financially or by receiving anything of value,’ (2) from participa-
tion in a venture, (3) they ‘knew or should have known has engaged in’
sex trafficking under § 1591.”81
Best Western and Wyndham moved to dismiss some of E.S.’s claims
under the Act on the basis that they were barred by the statute of limita-
tions, arguing specifically that § 1595 did not apply retroactively to claims
arising prior to December 23, 2008—the effective date for that section of
the TVPRA.82 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
noted at the outset of its analysis that several district courts—including
one in Texas—have ruled that the TVPRA does not apply retroactively.83
The district court agreed with the reasoning that there is no explicit evi-
dence that Congress intended the “financial beneficiary prong of [the
TVPRA] to apply retroactively,” and absent such evidence, there is a
“presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. No. 3:20-CV-00050-M, 2021 WL 37457, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2021).
80. Id.
81. Id. at *2–3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)).
82. Id. at *7.
83. Id. (citing Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-169-LY, 2019 WL 2572540, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2019), aff’d, 986 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2021)).
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jurisprudence.”84 Thus, even if E.S. pled a prima facie claim under § 1591
for violations of the TVPRA preceding December 23, 2008, she could not
recover because the TVPRA does not apply retroactively.85
Best Western further argued that E.S.’s “TVPRA claim [was] partially
barred because the TVPRA has a [ten]-year statute of limitations,”
meaning that Best Western is not liable for any violations that occurred
prior to January 8, 2010—ten years from the date that E.S. filed her law-
suit.86 In response, E.S. argued that the limitations period “[was] tolled
‘due to the force and coercion Plaintiff underwent by her trafficker.’”87
While the district court ruled in favor of Best Western and Wyndham on
the retroactivity issue, it concluded that Best Western’s defense based on
the ten-year limitations period was “better resolved at summary judg-
ment” due to factual issues involved with the tolling analysis.88
E. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
In Liquid Capital of America Corp. v. Effective Business Solutions
Inc.,89 a plaintiff-franchisor (Liquid) sued defendant-franchisee (EBS) for
breach of contract and indemnification and sued individual defendant-
guarantor Alfredo Machado (Machado) for fraud, negligent misrepresen-
tation, and breach of a guaranty in connection with a franchise agreement
signed between the parties on May 8, 2006.90 Liquid and EBS renewed
the agreement for another ten-year term on May 8, 2016, with Machado
contemporaneously executing a guaranty agreement to be held person-
ally liable for debts and obligations owed under the 2006 and 2016
franchise agreements.91 Beginning in 2018, Liquid realized that Machado
and EBS were borrowing funds from individual investors and failing to
disclose the existence of those investments to Liquid in annual financial
statements—both of which were breaches of the franchise agreements.92
Liquid was ultimately sued by one of these individual investors and termi-
nated EBS’s franchise on October 31, 2018.93 Liquid properly served EBS
and Machado (collectively, Defendants) through the Texas secretary of
state on November 28, 2018, and moved for substituted service on May
29, 2019, after Defendants failed to appear.94 Liquid moved for and ob-
tained an entry of default on October 3, 2019; and, thereafter, sought to
reduce the default to a judgment awarding Liquid compensatory damages
84. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at *8.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *7–8.
89. No. 3:18-CV-3102-S-BH, 2020 WL 2950412, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2020), adopt-
ing report and recommendation, No. 3:18-CV-3102-S-BH, 2020 WL 2926471, at *1 (N.D.





94. Id. at *2.
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against Defendants; indemnification for its losses, costs, and legal fees
under the franchise agreement; and recovery of “pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest at the maximum rates permitted by law.”95
While noting at the outset of its analysis that “[d]efault judgments are a
drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by
courts only in extreme situations,” and that the entry of a default judg-
ment is discretionary, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas recited a number of factors to consider when deciding whether to
grant a motion for default judgment, including:
(1) the amount of money involved; (2) whether there are material
issues of fact or issues of substantial public importance at stake; (3)
whether the default is technical in nature; (4) the extent of prejudice
to the plaintiff due to the delay; (5) whether the grounds for default
are clearly established; (6) the harsh effect of a default judgment; (7)
whether the default resulted from a good faith mistake or excusable
neglect on the defendant’s part; (8) whether the plaintiff’s actions
contributed to delay; and (9) whether the court would be obligated
to set aside the default on motion by the defendant.96
The district court concluded that the weight of the factors favored entry
of judgment for Liquid because Defendants were properly served, Liquid
did not contribute to any delay in seeking to resolve the lawsuit, and Liq-
uid was undoubtedly prejudiced by the unexcused delay by Defendants.97
While the burden for granting a motion for default judgment is rela-
tively high, once that threshold is reached the court will grant relief based
primarily on the allegations in the complaint—which the court takes as
true.98 While the factual allegations must consist of more than legally
conclusory allegations, “‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required,”
rendering the standard for granting relief even “less rigorous than that
under Rule 12(b)(6).”99 The district court then analyzed the pleaded alle-
gations and the legal standards for claims against EBS for breach of con-
tract and indemnification, as well as claims against Machado for fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the guaranty.100 The district
court’s analysis was strikingly similar in form to assessment of a Rule 12
motion to dismiss, with all allegations construed in favor of the plaintiff
and the allegations of fraud against Machado held to a heightened plead-
ing standard under Rule 9(b).101 The district court ultimately held that
Liquid satisfied the pleading standards for each of its claims, with the
exception of the indemnification claim against EBS.102 With respect to
95. Id.
96. Id. at *2–3 (citing Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998)).
97. Id. at *3–4.
98. Id. at *4 (citing Pathway Senior Living LLC v. Pathways Senior Living LLC, No.
3:15-CV-02607-M, 2016 WL 1059536, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2016)).
99. Id. (quoting Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir.
2015)).
100. Id. at *4–8.
101. Id. at *5–8.
102. Id.
2021] Franchise Law 85
the indemnification claim, the district court cited the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in holding that “[b]ecause [Liquid’s] indemnity
claim directly implicates the same type of recovery as its breach of con-
tract claim, it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim and should be
rejected.”103
Having concluded that Liquid satisfied all requirements for a grant of
its motion for default judgment, the district court granted the motion and
awarded the following damages, recoverable jointly and severally from
EBS and Machado:
[(1)] compensatory damages in the amount of $69,383.29; [(2)] attor-
ney’s fees and costs in the amount of $33,851.78; [(3)] pre-judgment
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from November 21, 2018[,]
until the date that final judgment is entered; and [(4)] post-judgment
interest at the applicable federal rate from the date of final judgment
until paid in full.104
F. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Janai v. Sanford Rose Associates International, Inc.,105 individual
franchisees (Janai-Nebo) appealed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sanford Rose Associates International, Inc. (San-
ford) regarding Sanford’s claims against Janai-Nebo for breach of the par-
ties’ franchise agreement and personal guaranty.106 Janai-Nebo executed
the franchise agreement on August 22, 2016, and paid 10% of the
$88,000.00 franchise fee to Sanford at the signing.107 Janai-Nebo attended
Phase I training in Dallas in late September 2016, but did not make any
additional payments toward the franchise fee.108 Then, on November 7,
2016, Janai-Nebo informed Sanford’s CEO that it wished to terminate its
franchise agreement.109 Sanford’s CEO informed Janai-Nebo that it was
still responsible for paying the remainder of the $88,000.00 franchise fee
and minimum royalty fees under the franchise agreement.110 Sanford sent
formal notice of default on November 11, 2016, providing Janai-Nebo
with “ten days to cure the default by paying the remainder of the
franchise fee.”111 Janai-Nebo did not pay the fee and Sanford sent a letter
of termination on November 28, 2016.112 Sanford filed suit on December
28, 2016, seeking outstanding amounts of franchise fee payments and roy-
103. Id. at *5 (first citing Am. Equip. Co. v. Turner Bros. Crane & Rigging, LLC, No.
4:13-CV-2011, 2014 WL 3543720, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2014); and then citing Madry v.
Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 44 F.3d 1004, 1994 WL 733494, at *2 (5th Cir. 1994)).
104. Id. at *11.







111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
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alties allegedly owed by Janai-Nebo.113 The trial court ultimately awarded
Sanford “$125,308.46 in actual damages, $216,797.81 in attorney’s fees,
$895[.00] in paralegal fees, $4,951.65 in litigation expenses, and $46,600.00
in appellate attorney’s fees” in the event that Janai-Nebo appeal
unsuccessfully.114
On appeal, Janai-Nebo raised nine points of error, arguing that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in “sustaining Sanford’s objec-
tions to Janai-Nebo’s summary judgment evidence, and [in] awarding
damages and attorney’s fees” to Sanford.115 At the outset of its analysis,
the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals held that four of these issues were
waived by Janai-Nebo because “[t]he argument following each of these
issues does not direct the court to the trial court’s order at issue, cite
supporting legal authority, or explain how the cited facts support the ar-
gument.”116 Where Janai-Nebo’s brief asserted legal conclusions without
citations to the record on appeal or merely by general reference to other
issues on appeal, the court of appeals concluded that “these issues pre-
sent nothing for our review.”117
The court of appeals did reach the merits of Janai-Nebo’s challenge to
the trial court’s grant of Sanford’s partial no-evidence summary judgment
motion but concluded: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling on the summary judgment motion despite Janai-Nebo claiming that
inadequate time for discovery had passed; (2) the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in striking portions of Janai-Nebo’s affidavit which merely
recited the elements of Janai-Nebo’s counterclaims or made other con-
clusory legal statements; and (3) Janai-Nebo failed to offer even a scintilla
of evidence in support of its counterclaim for breach of contract because
it relied exclusively on the language of the franchise agreement itself to
allege that Sanford prematurely terminated the agreement.118 Because
Janai-Nebo failed to support any of its counterarguments with sufficient
evidence, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of Sanford’s
no-evidence summary judgment motion and, therefore, did not need to
reach Janai-Nebo’s additional challenges to Sanford’s traditional sum-
mary judgment motion as an alternative basis for dismissing its
counterclaims.119
Regarding Janai-Nebo’s challenges to the trial court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Sanford on its claims for anticipatory breach
and breach of contract, the court of appeals concluded that Sanford pro-
vided sufficient evidence to support its claims—including its correspon-
dence with Janai-Nebo and Janai-Nebo’s deposition testimony affirming
that it wished to terminate its franchise agreement and did not intend to
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *1.
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *5–8.
119. Id. at *9.
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make further payments to Sanford—and likewise concluded that “Janai-
Nebo failed to present evidence raising a fact issue.”120 Specifically, the
court of appeals found it significant that Janai-Nebo failed to offer any
evidence contesting Sanford’s claims that it had ceased efforts to fund its
franchise payments months before it informed Sanford of its intention to
terminate the agreement; Janai-Nebo’s premature repudiation of the
franchise agreement was a key element of Sanford’s claim for anticipa-
tory breach, and Janai-Nebo failed to offer any evidence in rebuttal.121
Thus, the court of appeals overruled Janai-Nebo’s two issues with the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment on Sanford’s breach of contract
claims.122
Janai-Nebo’s final issue was with the trial court’s award of damages to
Sanford. Specifically, it objected to the award on the grounds that (1)
Sanford’s CEO was not an expert on damages; (2) future royalty pay-
ments were not yet due because the franchise agreement lacked an accel-
eration clause; and (3) the attorney’s fees awarded were unreasonable.123
The court of appeals rejected Janai-Nebo’s argument that the lack of an
acceleration clause in the agreement precluded an award of future royalty
payments.124 The court of appeals noted that, under Texas law:
When a party who is obligated to make future payments of money to
another absolutely repudiates the obligation without just excuse, the
obligee is entitled to maintain his action for damages at once for the
entire breach, and is entitled in one suit to receive in damages the
present value of the future payments payable to him by virtue of the
contract.125
The court of appeals was likewise unimpressed with Janai-Nebo’s chal-
lenge that Sanford’s CEO was not a competent witness to testify about
contract damages; in fact, the court of appeals noted that the accounting
used by Sanford’s CEO “accrued to [Janai-Nebo’s] benefit by understat-
ing the actual present value of all payments due before the end of the
term.”126 Finally, the court of appeals concluded that contemporaneous
billing records and affidavits by Sanford’s counsel were “more than suffi-
cient” evidence to support the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.127
Thus, Janai-Nebo’s final issue was overruled, and the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.128
In contrast to the Janai appeal, the appeal in Dulce Restaurants, LLC v.
120. Id. at *10–11.
121. Id. at *9–10.
122. Id. at *11–12.
123. Id. at *13.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Sys. Mktg. Inc., 686 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
126. Id. at *12.
127. Id. at *15.
128. Id.
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Texas Workforce Commission129 did not involve a dispute between a
franchisee and a franchisor but rather a dispute between a franchisee and
the State of Texas regarding unemployment taxes. The franchisee (Dulce)
had purchased four Krispy Kreme doughnut stores in the Dallas me-
troplex from the prior franchisee (North Texas Donuts) and the
franchisor, Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation (KKDC).130 Following
the sale, the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) transferred the prior
owners’ unemployment compensation experience rating to Dulce, caus-
ing Dulce to incur higher unemployment taxes for the years 2013–2015.131
Dulce paid the taxes under protest, sought a refund of $286,889.56
through an administrative hearing, and sought review of that ruling after
its refund was denied.132
In the trial court, both Dulce and TWC submitted cross-motions for
summary judgment.133 Dulce argued that “there was no substantially
common management or control” with the prior owners “to justify the
transfer of compensation experience” to Dulce after it assumed owner-
ship of the Krispy Kreme stores.134 In contrast, TWC argued that KKDC
and North Texas Donuts controlled “virtually every facet of Dulce’s in-
ternal operations.”135 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of TWC but relied on a novel theory of “continuity of control”—a theory
which was “not raised by either party in their respective motions for sum-
mary judgment, nor authorized by statute.”136 Furthermore, the trial
court’s written order granting TWC’s motion for summary judgment did
not expressly state the legal grounds for its ruling.137 Dulce appealed.
On appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Sev-
enth Amarillo Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting that “[w]hen
the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds relied on for entry of
summary judgment, we must affirm the judgment if any of the theories
presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meri-
torious.”138 The court of appeals agreed with Dulce that a “continuity of
control” theory was not raised by either party in their summary judgment
briefing and did not have any basis in the relevant statutory scheme and
thus could not serve as the basis of the trial court’s judgment.139 There-
fore, the court of appeals reasoned that the only remaining ground for
affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of TWC was TWC’s
original argument that Dulce’s predecessors retained “substantially com-
129. No. 07-19-00213-CV, 2020 WL 5755016, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 25, 2020,








137. Id. at *2–3.
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id. at *3–4.
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mon management or control” after Dulce purchased the four Krispy
Kreme locations.140
In response to TWC’s argument that either North Texas Donuts,
KKDC, or both retained control over Dulce’s day-to-day operations fol-
lowing the sale, Dulce countered that both entities ceased to exercise
“any control over the operation and management of the stores” after the
sales closed.141 Regarding Dulce’s relationship with KKDC following the
sale, the court of appeals agreed that it was a typical
franchisor–franchisee relationship, and that, absent clear facts to the con-
trary, a franchisee is typically an independent contractor and “[a]
franchisor does not control a franchisee beyond what is necessary to pro-
tect and maintain its trademark, trade name, and good will.”142 Likewise,
the court of appeals rejected TWC’s argument that North Texas Donuts
retained control over Dulce’s operations through the asset purchase
agreements for each location.143 As the court reasoned, not only did
North Texas Donut’s relationship with KKDC terminate upon the sale of
each location to Dulce, but evidence submitted by Dulce indicated that it
had no significant relationship or dealings with North Texas Donuts fol-
lowing the sales.144
Not only did the court of appeals find Dulce’s interpretation of “prede-
cessor employing unit” more persuasive than TWC’s expansive construc-
tion of that term, but the court also found that Dulce’s summary
judgment evidence was sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that
TWC improperly transferred unemployment compensation experience
from North Texas Donuts to Dulce following the sale of each Krispy
Kreme location.145 Thus, the trial court not only erred in granting TWC’s
motion for summary judgment but also erred in denying Dulce’s cross-
motion.146 The court of appeals, therefore, reversed the trial court’s rul-
ing and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to award
Dulce a refund of $286,889.56 in unemployment taxes, as well as interest
and court costs.147
The Janai and Dulce opinions each emphasize the importance of devel-
oping a strong evidentiary record in anticipation of summary judgment—
and well in advance of an appeal. In both cases, the losing parties on
appeal failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support their claims as a
matter of law, let alone sufficient evidence to create a fact issue preclud-
ing grants of summary judgment for their opponents. While a court of
appeals will apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s legal
140. Id. at *4.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *5 (citing Smith v. Foodmaker, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1996, no writ)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *6.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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findings on summary judgment, an appellate court will typically defer to a
trial court’s factual findings based on the evidence presented in the par-
ties’ summary judgment briefing. As in Janai, an appeal from a denial of
summary judgment is not the proper time nor place to introduce evidence
which should have been presented at the trial court level. Similarly, while
TWC in Dulce may not have had any choice but to rely on “substantially
common management or control” as the sole legal theory in support of its
summary judgment motion, its complete reliance on the language of the
agreements between Dulce and the prior owners allowed the court of
appeals to rule in favor of Dulce as a matter of law. Had TWC offered
witness testimony concerning the degree of control exercised over
Dulce’s stores by KKDC or the prior franchisee, such as the testimony of
employees or store managers regarding KKDC’s employee training poli-
cies, the court may have concluded that genuine issues of material fact
precluded summary judgment and remanded the case for trial.
III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION, AND
NON-RENEWAL
A. TERMINATION
In Fire Protection Service, Inc. v. Survitec Survival Products, Inc.,148 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas was tasked with
determining whether a dealer was required to repurchase inventory from
another dealer upon termination pursuant to the Texas Fair Practices of
Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and Dealers Act
(the Act). Survitec Survival Products, Inc. (Survitec) manufactured
marine safety and survival equipment, including life rafts, and entered
into a dealer arrangement with Fire Protection Services, Inc. (FPS).
Survitec terminated the arrangement in December 2017, and FPS filed
suit after Survitec refused to repurchase FPS’s life raft inventory.
Upon Survitec’s motion for partial summary judgment, the district
court had to interpret the Act to determine whether life rafts were en-
compassed in the Act’s definition of “equipment”—and, thus, were re-
quired to be repurchased upon termination of the dealer arrangement.149
Because neither the district court nor the parties could find any Texas
decisions that addressed whether life rafts were encompassed in the Act’s
definition, the district court endeavored to make an “Erie guess” as to
how the Texas Supreme Court would decide the issue.150
The district court recognized that the Act’s protections clearly favored
dealers, and that the definition of “equipment” was broad, namely be-
cause it was defined to include equipment “in connection with” a variety
of purposes identified in the Act—including mining.151 Texas courts had
148. No. 4:19-02162, 2019 WL 3766567, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2019).
149. Id. at *2.
150. Id. at *3.
151. Id.
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previously recognized that mining included offshore mining activities. In
an attempt to argue life rafts were only used in connection with lifesaving
activities, rather than mining activity, Survitec offered uncontested evi-
dence that life rafts were required on vessels under domestic and interna-
tional law.152 The district court rejected Survitec’s limited
characterization and concluded that the life rafts constituted “equip-
ment” under the Act, which required it to deny Survitec’s motion to
dismiss.153
Franchise and distribution suits can occur even after termination of an
agreement where one party continues to violate contractual prohibitions.
In Vonocom, Inc. v. AdvoCare International, LP, AdvoCare filed suit
against a former distributor for illegally selling AdvoCare products on
Amazon, which was prohibited by the Distributor Agreement in place
prior to the distributor’s termination.154 AdvoCare also alleged the for-
mer distributor was tortiously interfering with existing contracts by induc-
ing AdvoCare representatives to sell the distributor the products it was
illegally selling.155
After receiving a cease and desist letter from AdvoCare in which it
threatened to file suit, counsel for the former distributor discussed a po-
tential settlement, but no resolution was reached.156 AdvoCare filed suit
in a Texas trial court and moved for no-evidence and traditional summary
judgment on the former distributor’s two counterclaims of breach of con-
tract and economic coercion/duress, which the trial court granted and dis-
missed the counterclaims with prejudice.157 AdvoCare then gave notice
of nonsuit of its remaining claims, and the former distributor appealed
the dismissal of its counterclaims.158
The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals first noted that the trial court did
not specify the grounds relied upon in its order granting summary judg-
ment, and thus, the former distributor was required to challenge every
ground it could have been granted to obtain reversal.159 The former dis-
tributor first argued that the communications between counsel consti-
tuted a settlement agreement, which was breached when the lawsuit was
filed, but the court of appeals found there was no evidence of a meeting
of the minds and thus, no contract.160 The court likewise found there was
no evidence of economic duress because, even if it was an independent
cause of action as opposed to a defense to enforcement of a contract,
AdvoCare had only threatened civil lawsuits (which it had a legal right to
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Vonocom, Inc. v. AdvoCare Int’l, LP, No. 05-19-00610-CV, 2020 WL 1528496, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
155. Id. at *2–3.
156. Id. at *2.
157. Id. at *3.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *4.
160. Id. at *4–5.
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do) as opposed to criminal prosecution.161
B. NON-RENEWAL
Texas generally requires a person with a renewal option to strictly com-
ply with the terms of an option agreement.162 In Pizza Inn, Inc. v.
Clairday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined
whether the equitable intervention exception to strict compliance ex-
cused Clairday’s untimely notice to exercise an option to renew an Area
Development Agreement (the Agreement).163
In 1992, Clairday paid $1.25 million to enter into the Agreement with
Pizza Inn, Inc. (Pizza Inn), which had an initial twenty-year term followed
by two five-year renewal options.164 The Agreement provided that
Clairday was required to provide Pizza Inn with written notice at least six
months prior to expiration of the current term if he wanted to exercise a
renewal option.165 After providing timely notice for the first renewal,
Clairday only notified Pizza Inn of the second renewal four months prior
to the end of the first renewal period—two months after the contractual
deadline.166
Pizza Inn decided not to renew the Agreement and filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking declaratory judg-
ment, and Clairday filed counterclaims, including breach of contract.167
At trial, the parties submitted the issue of whether Clairday’s notice was
sufficiently timely to the district court while the jury decided all other
questions of fact.168 Applying the doctrine of equitable intervention, the
district court excused Clairday’s failure to provide timely notice, and
Clairday was awarded $250,000.00 in lost-profits damages, plus attorney’s
fees.169 Pizza Inn appealed to the Fifth Circuit and argued the district
court erred in applying the equitable intervention doctrine.170
The Fifth Circuit first explained that equitable intervention applied
when: (1) the delay was slight; (2) the loss to the lessor was small; and (3)
strictly enforcing a condition precedent would result in unconscionable
hardship to the party with the renewal option.171 Before analyzing the
facts of the case, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the doctrine was a
“narrow equitable exception to the rule of strict enforcement.”172 The
Fifth Circuit assumed the first two factors were met and focused its in-
quiry on whether strict compliance resulted in unconscionable hardship
161. Id. at *6–8.
162. See Zeidman v. Davis, 342 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. 1961).
163. Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday, 979 F.3d 1064, 1065–66 (5th Cir. 2020).







171. Id. at 1067 (citing Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W.2d 265, 272 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939)).
172. Id. (quoting In re Eldercare Props. Ltd., 568 F.3d 506, 522 (5th Cir. 2009)).
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to Clairday.173
Clairday argued that strict compliance would cause a partial forfeiture
of his purchase price, forfeiture of future profits, and a franchise store to
be closed.174 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the argument of partial forfei-
ture because Clairday had received the full bargain of his contract upon
the expiration of the second option period, and thus, he lost nothing more
than the power to exercise the option.175 Clairday’s argument for lost
profits was likewise dismissed because the Fifth Circuit concluded that if
lost profits alone were an unconscionable hardship, then the third factor
would be present in every case—unless a plaintiff sued to enforce an un-
profitable contract.176 Finally, the Fifth Circuit noted that the franchise
store was not associated with the Agreement but subject to separate con-
tracts not at issue.177 Finding that the equitable intervention doctrine did





In ProTradeNet, LLC v. Predictive Profiles, Inc.,179 a purveyor of vari-
ous franchise-related services to franchisee clients, ProTradeNet, LLC
(PTN), contracted with Predictive Profiles, Inc. (Predictive), a vendor
specializing in recruiting and hiring services, to allow Predictive to “mar-
ket and promote” its products to PTN’s clients.180 PTN acted as a re-
source to its client franchisees by recommending Preferred Vendors for a
wide range of services—product suppliers, technology support, employ-
ment services, etc.—which the franchisees were free to use or ignore.181
As acknowledged by Predictive’s CEO, Predictive understood that its
agreement with PTN was nonexclusive, meaning that PTN and its fran-
chisee clients were welcome to do business with other Preferred Vendors
offering services that competed with Predictive.182 The CEO also ac-
knowledged that the agreement with PTN contained no guarantees, quo-
tas, or other assurances that the relationship would benefit Predictive
financially.183 In inking the deal, Predictive was primarily interested in
gaining exposure to PTN’s client base of franchisees, gaining the ability to
display PTN’s trademarks on Predictive’s website, and hoping to leverage
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1068.
175. Id. at 1068–69.
176. Id. at 1069.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1069–70.
179. No. 6:18-CV-38-ADA, 2020 WL 5510732, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2020).
180. Id. at *1–2.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id.
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PTN’s connections to other Preferred Vendors to grow Predictive’s
business.184
Shortly after signing the agreement, Predictive began using PTN’s plat-
form to market its services to franchisees but experienced lackluster in-
terest from franchisees.185 The primary reason was that Predictive did not
previously have a relationship with Indeed.com—a national recruiting
website—and Predictive’s attempts to better integrate with Indeed.com
after becoming a Preferred Vendor with PTN was causing disruptions in
Predictive’s job postings. This, in turn, caused Predictive’s customers to
be inundated with unwanted job applications.186 Following a spate of
complaints by its franchisee clients and additional concerns about Predic-
tive’s business model, PTN attempted to solicit additional vendors to im-
prove the usability and reliability of Predictive’s recruiting services—with
specific emphasis on its applicant tracking system.187 While both parties
initially signaled a willingness to collaborate in resolving the issues with
Predictive’s software and maintaining Predictive’s status as a Preferred
Vendor, the relationship eventually soured, and Predictive stopped re-
turning phone calls and emails to PTN and related vendors.188 At one
point, Predictive threatened to pull out of the deal entirely and remove
job offerings for PTN’s clients and accused PTN of breaching the parties’
agreement by marketing CareerPlug—one of Predictive’s competitors—
as an alternative Preferred Vendor.189
PTN eventually terminated its agreement with Predictive and informed
Predictive that it was no longer authorized to use PTN’s trademarks or
domain names utilizing those marks.190 At the time, Predictive was using
each of PTN’s eleven protected marks in URLs for its online services.
Rather than take down these URLs following PTN’s termination of the
agreement, Predictive simply registered new URLs and automatically re-
directed traffic from the offending URLs to the new ones.191 Predictive
also continued utilizing PTN’s trademarks on the redirected web
pages.192 PTN sued Predictive on a range of theories, including breach of
contract, trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, and cyber-
squatting under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACCPA), seeking damages, injunctive relief, and corrective advertis-
ing.193 Predictive counterclaimed for breach of contract and tortious in-
terference with existing and prospective contracts.194
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at *3–4.
188. Id. at *5.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *8.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *11, *14–20.
194. Id. at *12–14.
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Following a bench trial, the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas rejected Predictive’s claim for breach of the agreement, noting
that “the [a]greement expressly provide[d] that PTN’s sole obligation
[was] to let its franchisees ‘know of [Predictive’s platform] and nothing
else,’” and concluding that Predictive failed to offer any evidence that it
was entitled to expect any profits under the agreement.195 Furthermore,
the district court observed that Predictive also failed to provide any “ob-
jective facts, figures, or data supporting Predictive’s damage model.”196
Likewise, Predictive’s claims for tortious interference with existing and
prospective contracts were doomed by its own CEO’s testimony that
“any interference with any agreements was inadvertent, not intentional”
and the sworn statements that Predictive never had any independent con-
tracts with PTN’s franchisees.197
In contrast, the district court found in favor of PTN on all of its claims.
Regarding breach of contract, the district court held that Predictive
breached its agreement with PTN by (1) continuing to utilize trademarks
after termination, and (2) posting nonexistent jobs for franchisees utiliz-
ing PTN’s system.198 The district court awarded approximately $21,015.00
in damages for breach of contract to compensate PTN and related ven-
dors for time spent trying to fix Predictive’s service, responding to fran-
chisee complaints, and rectifying confusions caused by the unauthorized
use of PTN’s marks by Predictive.199
Regarding PTN’s Lanham Act claim, the district court found that PTN
successfully proved each element of its claim, namely that (1) PTN owned
the disputed marks, and (2) Predictive’s use of infringing marks posed a
likelihood of confusion.200 In assessing likelihood of confusion, the dis-
trict court applied the Fifth Circuit’s non-exhaustive eight-factor test: “(1)
strength of the mark; (2) mark similarity; (3) product or service similarity;
(4) outlet and purchaser identity; (5) advertising media identity; (6) de-
fendant’s intent; (7) actual confusion; and (8) care exercised by potential
purchasers.”201 The district court not only found that Predictive’s unau-
thorized use of PTN’s marks posed a likelihood of confusion but also held
that Predictive’s acts were “both willful and malicious.”202
In calculating appropriate damages to award PTN, the district court
noted that multiple approaches were available under the Lanham Act:
“(1) the trademark owner’s damages, which can include lost profits, price
erosion damages, damage to the mark, and corrective advertising; (2)
reasonabl[e] royalty; (3) disgorgement of the infringer’s profits; and (4)
195. Id. at *12.
196. Id. at *13.
197. Id. at *13–14.
198. Id. at *11.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *14–15.
201. Id. at *14 (citing Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 329 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
202. Id. at *15.
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statutory damages, in the case of trademark counterfeiting.”203 As ap-
plied to the facts of the case, the district court found a reasonable royalty
to be $100,000.00 per year or $150,000.00 total, which included amounts
PTN was likely to incur for corrective advertising aimed at reversing con-
fusion caused by Predictive’s infringement.204 The district court also is-
sued a permanent injunction prohibiting Predictive from engaging in
infringing acts in the future.205 Lastly, the district court concluded that
“this [is] an exceptional case” justifying the award of attorney’s fees to
PTN.206
The district court likewise found that PTN carried its burden of proof
on its ACCPA claim, requiring PTN to show that “(1) its mark ‘is a dis-
tinctive or famous mark entitled to protection’; (2) Predictive’s ‘domain
names are “identical or confusingly similar to” [PTN’s marks]; and (3)
Predictive registered, trafficked, or used the domain names with the bad
faith intent to profit from them.’”207 After concluding that PTN suffered
damages as a result of Predictive’s cybersquatting, the district court
awarded $550,000.00 in statutory damages—$50,000.00 per infringing do-
main.208 The district court also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting
future ACCPA violations by Predictive.209 As with PTN’s Lanham Act
claims, the district court concluded that “this [was] an exceptional case”
and awarded PTN its attorney’s fees related to the ACCPA claim.210
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Pizza Inn,
Inc. v. Odetallah211 also involved a claim for infringement under the Lan-
ham Act. In that case, a franchisor (Pizza Inn) sued its franchisee
(Odetallah) for breach of the franchise agreement and trademark in-
fringement, alleging that Odetallah continued to use Pizza Inn’s marks
without authorization following the alleged expiration of the franchise
agreement.212 Pizza Inn requested that the district court grant a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting Odetallah from continuing to operate the
franchise and from displaying Pizza Inn’s trademarks.213
Despite the fact that “Odetallah failed to appear at the preliminary
injunction hearing” or otherwise “oppose Pizza Inn’s requested relief,”
the district court held that “Pizza Inn’s motion for preliminary injunction
fails at the outset because there has been no clear showing of a substan-
203. Id. at *16 (citing LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL
EXPERT 20.24–.31 (Roman L. Weil, Peter B. Frank, Christian W. Hughes & Michael J.
Wagner eds., 4th ed. 2007)).
204. Id. at *16–18.
205. Id. at *18.
206. Id.
207. Id. at *19 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)).
208. Id. at *20.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. No. 4:19-CV-856, 2020 WL 4677685, at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 14, 2020) (discussed
infra Section V.A regarding common law claims).
212. Id.
213. Id.
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tial likelihood of success on its breach-of-contract claim.”214 While the
validity of the original franchise agreement seemed clear, the district
court noted that “Pizza Inn’s evidence raises more questions than it an-
swers about the state of the parties’ contractual relations, including
whether the original franchise agreement executed in 2007 remains in ef-
fect, and whether the renewal agreement was ever formed.”215 Critically,
the renewal agreement was intended to be a temporary extension of the
original franchise agreement but was conditioned on the parties entering
into a new franchise agreement with a ten-year term—a condition which
never occurred.216 Because Pizza Inn could not show that any agreement
was effective between the parties, it could not satisfy its burden of show-
ing a probability of success, as required for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.217
Because it was not clear which—if any—agreements between the par-
ties were valid and enforceable against Odetallah, the district court con-
cluded that Pizza Inn likewise failed to demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of success on its claim for trademark infringement, thereby
precluding any award of injunctive relief.218 In this case, “[t]he parties’
original franchise agreement provided Odetallah a license” to use Pizza
Inn’s marks until 2027.219 Thus, Pizza Inn’s contention that Odetallah’s
license expired on June 30, 2019, was completely dependent on the afore-
mentioned issues of (1) whether the temporary renewal agreement was
validly formed, and (2) if it was not formed, whether the original
franchise agreement was still enforceable against either party. Because a
valid license would preclude Odetallah’s liability for infringement alto-
gether, Pizza Inn’s failure to adduce sufficient evidence of a binding
agreement between the parties was fatal to its request for a preliminary
injunction of Odetallah’s use of its marks.220
The franchisor in JTH Tax LLC v. White221 fared slightly better than
the franchisor in Odetallah, securing a partial grant of its motion for a
temporary restraining order and request for preliminary injunction.222 To
reiterate the background of this case, discussed previously, the franchisor
(JTH, doing business as Liberty Tax Service) sued its franchisee (White)
for breach of contract and trademark infringement and dilution following
the parties’ execution of the Mutual Termination Agreement, which pur-
ported to terminate White’s franchised tax preparation business.223 As
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id. at *3.
216. Id. at *2–3.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *4.
219. Id.
220. Id. (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:30 (5th ed. 2021)).
221. No. 6-20-CV-00140-ADA, 2020 WL 3843691, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2020) (dis-
cussed supra Section II.B regarding choice-of-law issues and infra Section VII.B regarding
injunctive relief).
222. Id. at *7.
223. Id. at *1.
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alleged by JTH, White made only marginal efforts to comply with the
Mutual Termination Agreement and continued using “confusingly similar
images of the [S]tatue of Liberty” on its signs, as well as slogans and mar-
keting materials, which mimicked JTH’s protected marks.224 JTH also
provided photos showing that White continued to use JTH’s marks in
signs outside and within White’s business, including posters and other
marketing materials provided to White by JTH during the course of their
franchise relationship.225
As in ProTradeNet, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas undertook the Fifth Circuit-approved multi-factor balancing test in
assessing the likelihood of confusion, noting that “[t]o recover on a claim
of trademark infringement, a plaintiff must show ‘that the mark is legally
protectable and must then establish infringement by showing a likelihood
of confusion.’”226 As the district court explained, “[l]ikelihood of confu-
sion is synonymous with a probability of confusion, which is more than a
mere possibility of confusion.”227 As applied to the evidence adduced by
JTH, the district court concluded that there was a sufficient showing of
likelihood of success regarding White’s unauthorized use of materials
bearing “a three-dimensional sculpture in the shape of the Statue of Lib-
erty,” as well as White’s use of the exact materials provided to him by
JTH while their franchise agreement was in effect.228 While White con-
tested the likelihood of confusion regarding depictions of the Statue of
Liberty on marketing materials and artwork within his tax business,
White did not dispute JTH’s assertion that he continued using the exact
materials provided by JTH.229
Moving on to its analysis of the probability of irreparable harm, the
district court ultimately concluded that—despite JTH’s showing of likeli-
hood of success on the merits of its trademark claim—JTH failed to meet
the remaining prerequisites for a preliminary injunction.230 Concerning
the requirement that JTH face a substantial threat of irreparable harm,
the district court was persuaded by White’s statements that the storefront
sign at issue was “covered completely by a new sign not bearing any
[JTH] marks,” and that “all employees were not to present themselves or
the office as [JTH affiliates], and that all signs and cards have no mention
of [JTH or JTH marks] on them.”231 Based on this showing by White, the
district court concluded that JTH failed to clearly show that any injury
posed by White’s alleged ongoing infringement could not be adequately
224. Id. at *3.
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir.
2008)).
227. Id. at *4 (quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 543 (5th Cir.
1998)), abrogated on other grounds by TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001)).
228. Id. at *3–4.
229. Id. at *4, *6.
230. Id. at *4, *7.
231. Id. at *6.
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measured in monetary damages.232 Because JTH failed to carry its bur-
den to show a substantial threat of irreparable harm, the remaining fac-
tors—balancing of hardships and weighing of public interest—were
insufficient to grant a preliminary injunction against White for the use of
JTH’s marks on White’s marketing materials.233 However, although the
bulk of JTH’s requested injunctive relief was denied, the district court did
order White to return JTH’s operations manual and copies of any docu-
ments or media received from JTH and to refrain from using any JTH
marks for any purpose.234
In Buttermilk Sky of TN LLC v. Bake Moore, LLC,235 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas was also faced with a request for
preliminary injunction, arising from alleged trademark infringement by
competing pie shops.236 In Buttermilk, the plaintiff-franchisor, Buttermilk
Sky of TN, LLC, and its related franchising corporation (collectively,
Buttermilk) sued a former affiliate, Bake Moore, LLC (Bake Moore) for
violating “franchise rules and [Buttermilk] employment agreements.”237
The entities had previously had an amiable relationship. Bake Moore’s
owner (Craig Moore) served as CEO, board member, and preferred
shareholder of Buttermilk before branching out to open two Bake Moore
shops in Texas under a “spoken agreement between the parties” that
Bake Moore would follow Buttermilk’s corporate rules “in lieu of signing
any agreement.”238 Buttermilk would later fire Craig Moore and send a
letter revoking the oral license granted to Bake Moore after Craig Moore
and his co-founder (Donnie Robertson) refused to sign a franchise agree-
ment with Buttermilk.239
After Bake Moore continued to operate following Buttermilk’s revoca-
tion of its license, Buttermilk filed a lawsuit and a motion for preliminary
injunction on the same day, seeking to enjoin Bake Moore from continu-
ing to utilize Buttermilk’s trademarks in alleged violation of the Lanham
Act.240 The district court noted that a party seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion must “clearly carr[y] the burden of persuasion on all four” of the
following elements: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) a substantial threat that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any
damage that the injunction might cause the defendant; and (4) that the
injunction will not disserve the public interest.”241
Regarding the first element, the district court held that Buttermilk
failed to carry its burden to prove a substantial likelihood of success on
232. Id.
233. Id. at *7.
234. Id. at *8.
235. No. 4:20-CV-00327, 2020 WL 4673909, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2020).
236. Id. at *2–3.
237. Id.
238. Id. at *1.
239. Id. at *2.
240. Id. at *2–3.
241. Id. at *2 (quoting Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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the merits of its claims that Bake Moore infringed its trademarks and
trade dress.242 While the district court agreed with Buttermilk that its
trademarks and trade dress were likely to be sufficiently distinctive to be
protectable, the district court disagreed with Buttermilk on the likelihood
of confusion.243 Employing the aforementioned eight-factor test endorsed
by the Fifth Circuit, the district court concluded that Buttermilk might be
able to establish confusion in later proceedings, but “right now, [Butter-
milk] just make[s] conclusory allegations with no case law or evidence to
substantiate [its] claims.”244 At root, the district court took issue with
Buttermilk’s analysis of confusion, finding that it was conflating two
acts—the unauthorized use of Buttermilk’s trademarks and trade dress
with the similarity of the underlying confections.245
While Buttermilk’s failure to show a likelihood of confusion doomed
its request for a preliminary injunction, the district court also noted that
Buttermilk failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm if a pre-
liminary injunction was denied.246 The court was particularly critical of
Buttermilk’s argument that Bake Moore’s products would be confused
with Buttermilk’s trademarks and trade dress, with Judge Mazzant noting
he was “not convinced” by the relatively weak evidence put forth in favor
of that argument. Buttermilk’s claims were further condemned by the
photographs of Bake Moore’s shops before and after its rebranding pro-
cess. Those photos, according to the court, evidenced that Bake Moore
was “no longer using” Buttermilk’s trademarks or trade dress and there-
fore doomed Buttermilk’s claim that it would “suffer irreparable harm
without an injunction.”247 Likewise, the district court held that the final
two factors—balancing of hardships and public interest—were each neu-
tral, “meaning that [Buttermilk has] not carried [its] burden on this ele-
ment.”248 Thus, the district court denied Buttermilk’s motion for
preliminary injunction.249
While these cases illustrate the significant flexibility that courts have to
remedy trademark and trade dress infringement and cybersquatting, they
also demonstrate the high standards for parties seeking preliminary in-
junctive relief—“an extraordinary remedy [that] should only be granted if
the [movant] ha[s] clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four
requirements.”250 While a successful claimant under the Lanham Act or
ACCPA may be entitled to significant sums of damages for royalties, cor-
rective advertising, attorney’s fees, and compensation for any diminished
value of its protected marks, courts are loath to grant injunctive relief
242. Id. at *9.
243. Id. at *3, *9.
244. Id. at *8 (citing Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 912 F.3d
805, 812 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Jan. 29, 2019), as revised (Feb. 14, 2019)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at *10–11.
247. Id. at *11.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at *2 (citing Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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without the benefit of a full evidentiary record. This is especially true for
determinations of likelihood of confusion, which often turn on nuanced
and subjective factual findings.
B. TRADE SECRETS
As part of its analysis of Buttermilk’s request for injunctive relief, the
district court in Buttermilk also considered Buttermilk’s likelihood of suc-
cess on its claims for trade secret misappropriation.251 Specifically, But-
termilk alleged that Bake Moore violated the Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA) and the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) because
Bake Moore continued to use Buttermilk’s pie recipes after Buttermilk
revoked Bake Moore’s oral license agreement.252 However, the district
court’s analysis in this case was very brief because Buttermilk offered
little evidence in support of its claim aside from the relatively unremark-
able facts that (1) Bake Moore’s pies look similar to Buttermilk’s pies—
in that they “are decorated in a similar manner,”—and (2) Bake Moore’s
pies “contain some of the same ingredients as the Buttermilk Sky
pies.”253 Not only are these facts problematic because Buttermilk never
alleged that its pie design was a trade secret, but also Buttermilk’s cross-
examination of one of Bake Moore’s witnesses revealed that Bake Moore
“uses a different brand of pre-cooked apples” in its pies, as well as “a
different type of flour in its pie crust.”254 Because Buttermilk provided no
explanation for how it could succeed in proving a likelihood of success on
the merits without addressing differences in the ingredients used in Bake
Moore’s pies, the district court held that Buttermilk was also not entitled
to a preliminary injunction on its claims for misappropriation of trade
secrets.255
V. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES: CONTRACT FORMATION AND INTERPRETATION
When a franchise relationship breaks down, a claim for breach of con-
tract is both parties’ most obvious claim because franchise agreements
are, of course, contracts. Recent case law serves as a reminder that, like
all contracts, the rules of formation—consideration and mutual assent—
must be observed in the making of franchise agreements.
One case from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
serves as a stark reminder that missing a step on the path to contract
formation can have drastic consequences.256 In Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Odetal-




255. Id. at *9–10.
256. See Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Odetallah, No. 4:19-CV-856, 2020 WL 4677685, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. May 14, 2020) (discussed supra Section IV.A.1 regarding the unauthorized use of
trademarks).
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lah, the district court refused to grant preliminary injunctive relief to
Pizza Inn despite the fact that Odetallah failed to appear.257
Pizza Inn and Odetallah first entered into a franchise agreement on
July 2, 2007. The agreement was for operation of a Pizza Inn restaurant
for a period of twenty years. On July 1, 2009, Pizza Inn and Odetallah
entered into a “renewal agreement” which stated that the original
franchise agreement expired June 30, 2009, the parties would enter into a
new franchise agreement, and “purported to extend the franchise rela-
tionship to June 30, 2019.”258 In other words, the renewal agreement pur-
ported to terminate the franchise relationship in 2019 but stated a new
franchise agreement would be executed on those terms. The new
franchise agreement was never actually executed.259
After June 30, 2019, Odetallah continued to operate the Pizza Inn res-
taurant, so Pizza Inn sued and moved for preliminary injunctive relief.
Odetallah did not appear. Nevertheless, the district court held that Pizza
Inn had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.260
The parties never entered into the new franchise agreement, and, in the
district court’s view, it was not clear whether the renewal agreement was
binding because entering the new franchise agreement was a condition of
the renewal agreement that had failed.261 The district court hedged its
holding, stating that it only found Pizza Inn had not met its burden under
the preliminary injunction standard.262 It noted the first franchise agree-
ment, with a term running until 2027, had clearly been formed, but it was
not clear that the new franchise agreement had been formed.263 The re-
newal agreement contemplated execution of a new franchise agreement;
the renewal agreement was not a contract in and of itself because, by its
own terms, the execution of a new franchise agreement was a condition to
formation.264
Odetallah shows that the mechanics of formation matter. Parties that
use temporary instruments, such as renewal agreements or letters of in-
tent, must be certain whether those instruments are binding or nonbind-
ing and proceed accordingly.
In another case, Pizza Inn was the beneficiary of a district court’s strict
adherence to contractual formalities.265 In Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday,
counter-plaintiff Clairday alleged that Pizza Inn breached an area devel-
opment agreement by refusing to renew the agreement, even though




260. Id. at *2.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *3 n.3.
263. Id. at *3.
264. Id. (citing Hohenberg Bros. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.
1976)).
265. See Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday, 979 F.3d 1064 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussed supra Sec-
tion III.B regarding franchise non-renewal).
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renewal option. Clairday was a long-time franchisee who later became an
area developer. His option agreement provided he had to give notice not
less than six months before the expiration of the current term of the
agreement. When he exercised his option two months late, Pizza Inn de-
clined to renew the agreement and filed suit for a declaratory judgment.
Clairday counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court relied
on the doctrine of equitable intervention to hold that the untimely notice
was excused. Pizza Inn appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed.266
Equitable intervention only excuses strict compliance from an optionee
under Texas law when: (1) the delay is slight; (2) the loss to the optioner
would be small; and (3) failure to “grant relief would result in such hard-
ship . . . as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the condition
precedent.”267 In Texas, the doctrine has only been applied to lease op-
tions.268 Assuming without deciding that the two-month delay was slight
and the loss to Pizza Inn would be small, the Fifth Circuit focused on the
issue of unconscionable hardship.269 It found this was a high bar to clear
and one that might only be applicable in cases involving lease options.270
Finding the alleged hardships from Pizza Inn’s denial of contract renewal
too small or too disconnected to be unconscionable for Clairday, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court’s application of the equitable interven-
tion doctrine.271
On its face, Clairday stands for the proposition that equitable interven-
tion will rarely, if ever, apply in franchise-related area developer agree-
ments. More broadly, however, it is a cautionary tale about adherence to
formal requirements in contract renewal. Especially when viewed side by
side, Odetallah and Clairday demonstrate that courts will hold parties to
the requirements they themselves agree upon for formation and renewal,
regardless of whether the party asserting breach is a franchisor or
franchisee.
In another case, the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals relied on principles
of consideration to interpret a franchise agreement and to find breach.272
In Janai v. Sanford Rose Associates International, Inc., Janai’s company,
Nebo, entered into a franchise agreement with Sanford, an executive
search firm. Janai entered a guarantee, and the court of appeals referred
to Janai and Nebo collectively as Janai-Nebo given their close intercon-
nection. The franchise agreement required Janai-Nebo to make a partial
266. Id. at 1065–66.
267. Id. at 1066–67 (quoting Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W.2d 265, 272 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.]
1939)).
268. Id. at 1067 n.2.
269. Id. at 1067.
270. Id. at 1067–68.
271. Id. at 1068–70.
272. See Janai v. Sanford Rose Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 05-18-01079-CV, 2020 WL
728428, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (discussed supra
Section II.F regarding Motion for Summary Judgment standards and infra Section VII.A
regarding compensatory damages and attorney’s fee awards).
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down payment of the franchise fee and to pay the balance at the later of
the first day of franchisee training or the completion of a self-funding
process. It also required periodic royalty payments. At training, Janai-
Nebo claimed the self-funding process was still ongoing and that the rest
of the franchise fee was not due. Several weeks later, Janai emailed San-
ford saying she did not want to go through with the franchise relationship
and wanted to terminate the agreement. Sanford told her she still had
fees and royalties due and that she should make a buyout offer. She re-
fused to pay a fee.273 Around the same time, Janai told the self-funding
service provider that she was putting the franchise on hold but did not
inform Sanford she was stalling the self-funding process. Sanford sent a
notice of default for nonpayment followed by a notice of termination.274
Sanford sued for breach of the franchise agreement, breach of the per-
sonal guarantee, anticipatory breach, and quantum meruit and promis-
sory estoppel. Janai-Nebo counterclaimed on various grounds. Sanford
filed motions for summary judgment on the counterclaims, as well as its
claims for breach, anticipatory breach, and damages. The district court
granted all of Sanford’s motions, and Janai-Nebo appealed.275
The court of appeals refused to consider many of Janai’s arguments on
appeal because they were threadbare, offering little to no argument or
factual support.276 It did consider the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sanford for breach of contract, anticipatory breach,
and damages.277
In assessing these claims, the court of appeals rested its finding for San-
ford primarily on Janai’s failure to present any evidence that the self-
funding process remained incomplete.278 Sanford, on the other hand,
presented evidence “that Janai had a ‘fixed intention to abandon, re-
nounce, and refuse to perform’ the Franchise Agreement.”279 Janai’s po-
sition was that the balance of the franchise fee was due at the later of the
new franchisee training or the completion of the self-funding process, and
the self-funding process had never been completed. Sanford’s position
was that Janai had clearly given up on the self-funding process and repu-
diated the contract. The appellate court agreed with Sanford, affirming
the grant of summary judgment on Sanford’s claim for anticipatory
breach.280
The court of appeals also agreed with Sandford on the breach of con-
tract claim.281 The court looked to the first amendment to the franchise
agreement, which stated that if the self-funding process “should fail to
273. Id.
274. Id. at *2.
275. Id.
276. See id. at *3–9.
277. Id. at *9, *11, *13.
278. See id. at *9.
279. Id. at *10 (citing Hunter v. PriceKubecka, PLLC, 339 S.W.3d 795, 802 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)).
280. Id. at *10–11.
281. Id. at *12.
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occur,” then the balance of the franchise fee becomes due.282 It read this
to mean there were two possible scenarios: (1) the self-funding process
becoming complete, or (2) the self-funding process failing and ending.283
It rejected Janai’s position that there was a third scenario where the self-
funding process was “delayed indefinitely,” causing similar delay of the
payment.284 While both readings may have been plausible, Janai’s posi-
tion would render the first amendment to the franchise agreement void
for an illusory promise (i.e., a failure of consideration), meaning that San-
ford’s reading had to be the correct one.285
While rudimentary elements of contract formation may get little atten-
tion compared to negotiation of terms such as franchise fees and royalty
payments, these basic principles of contract law are essential building
blocks that courts look to, and the absence of which will be dispositive to
franchise-related lawsuits. Recent cases are a reminder, not just that
counsel should double check these elements are met at the outset of a
franchise relationship, but also that litigators should pay attention to
these issues and raise them when appropriate because they can be dispos-
itive to a case.
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO)
In Arruda v. Curves International, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas held that a franchisee could not use a civil
RICO claim as a back door to a private right of action under the
FTCA.286 Although franchisors must make certain disclosures under the
FTCA, the FTCA does not provide a civil remedy to a franchisee who
claims damages based on an alleged failure to meet those disclosure re-
quirements.287 Despite the bar on a private right of action under the
FTCA, franchisees have attempted various means of using the FTCA’s
requirements to substantiate a cause of action, which courts have re-
soundingly rejected.288
In Arruda, the plaintiffs alleged they had been hoodwinked into enter-
ing franchise agreements with Curves because the value of the Curves




285. Id. at *11–12.
286. Arruda v. Curves Int’l, Inc., No. 6:20-CV-00092-ADA, 2020 WL 4289380, at *4
(W.D. Tex. July 27, 2020), appeal filed, No. 20-50734 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussed supra Sec-
tion II.A.1 regarding subject-matter jurisdiction).
287. Id.
288. See id. (first citing Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248–49 (5th. Cir. 1978); then
citing Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1996); then citing
R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 708 F.2d 570,
574–75, 574 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983); then citing Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986,
988–89, 1001–02 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and then citing Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279,
280–81 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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mation from them in its required disclosures. To that end, they asserted a
civil RICO claim.289
RICO provides a cause of action when, among other things, a defen-
dant engages in “two or more predicate criminal acts.”290 The district
court granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the federally-re-
quired disclosures did not “impose[ ] a duty upon [d]efendants that can
be the basis for a cause of action in RICO.”291 The district court went on
to state that the FTCA requirements could not provide the basis for state
law claims, including an action under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act and a claim of common law fraud.292
The upshot of Arruda is that courts draw a hard line around the
FTCA’s lack of a private right of action. Here, the district court recog-
nized the RICO claim for what it was: an attempted end-run around the
fact that failure to comply with the FTCA empowers the FTC to take
action but does not provide relief to a franchisee. Arruda is currently on
appeal, but reversal is unlikely because reversal would build a back door
into the FTCA.
B. UNEMPLOYMENT TAXES
In Dulce Restaurants, LLC v. Texas Workforce Commission, Dulce ac-
quired three Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation stores in the Dallas
metroplex.293 The TWC transferred the unemployment compensation ex-
perience rating (which sets the rate of unemployment taxes levied on an
employer) of franchisor Krispy Kreme, as seller, to franchisee Dulce, as
buyer, resulting in higher unemployment taxes for Dulce than it would
otherwise pay. Dulce paid the taxes under protest and sought a refund
through an administrative hearing. The application for a refund was de-
nied, and Dulce filed suit. The trial court granted TWC’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, and Dulce appealed.294
The Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed.295 An old em-
ployer’s compensation experience rating will be applied to a new em-
ployer if the “predecessor employing unit transfers, through any means,
all or part of the organization, trade, or business” and if there is “substan-
tially common management or control or substantially common owner-
ship of the entities.”296 The court of appeals decided that because Krispy
Kreme “was merely a franchisor and did not have ‘substantially common
management or control’ over Dulce’s day-to-day operations,” the unem-
289. Id. at *1–2.
290. Id. at *3.
291. Id. at *4.
292. Id. at *4–5 (citing Hidden Values, Inc. v. Wade, No. 3:11-CV-1917-L, 2012 WL
1836087, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2012)).
293. Dulce Rests., LLC v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 07-19-00213-CV, 2020 WL
5755016, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussed supra
Section II.F regarding Motion for Summary Judgment standards).
294. Id. at *1–2.
295. Id. at *6.
296. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 204.083.
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ployment compensation experience rating had been improperly trans-
ferred, and Dulce was entitled to a refund.297
Dulce demonstrates one of the practical consequences of a
franchisor–franchisee relationship as distinguished from some other
buyer–seller-type relationships. The fact that Dulce ultimately received a
refund affirms a certain level of independence that franchisees enjoy. On
a more literal level, Dulce is simply good news for any franchisees who
are charged higher-than-expected unemployment taxes and a reminder
that franchisees should examine their unemployment tax liability to make
sure they have not been erroneously charged higher taxes based on the
franchisor’s unemployment compensation experience rating.
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
If a party absolutely repudiates a contractual obligation to make future
payments without just excuse, Texas law entitles the other party to re-
cover the present value of all future payments.298 In Janai v. Sanford
Rose Associates International, Inc., the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals ex-
amined the trial court’s award of future royalty payments upon the fran-
chisee’s repudiation of a franchise agreement.299
Sanford, an executive search firm and franchisor, signed a franchise
agreement with Anne Janai in August 2016.300 Janai subsequently as-
signed her interests to Nebo & Finch, Inc. (Nebo), a company she estab-
lished to run the franchise—she was its only member; she also signed a
personal guaranty.301 Nebo paid 10% of the $88,000.00 franchise fee
upon signing, and the remainder was due on the first day of franchisee
training or when the franchisee’s self-funding process was complete—
whichever occurred later.302 Nebo was also obligated to pay royalties to
Sanford at a minimum amount of $2,500.00 per quarter commencing
ninety days after operations began.303
Janai attended training but claimed the self-funding process was incom-
plete and, thus, did not pay the balance of the franchise fee at that time.
Less than two weeks later, Janai notified Sanford that she wanted to ter-
minate the franchise agreement and then discontinued the self-funding
297. Dulce, 2020 WL 5755016, at *5–6.
298. See Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Sys. Mktg. Inc., 686 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 102 S.W.2d
405, 406 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937)); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 991 S.W.2d 440, 448 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
299. Janai v. Sanford Rose Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 05-18-01079-CV, 2020 WL 728428, at
*13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (discussed supra Section
II.F regarding Motion for Summary Judgment standards, as well as Section V.A regarding
common law claims).
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process.304 Sanford sent a notice of default for failure to pay the rest of
the franchise fee and terminated the franchise agreement when Janai
failed to cure the default.305
Sanford filed suit to recover the remaining franchise fee and future roy-
alties, and Janai and Nebo (collectively, Janai-Nebo) filed numerous
counterclaims, including fraud and violations under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.306 The trial court granted five motions for partial summary
judgment in favor of Sanford and awarded it more than $125,000.00 in
actual damages for the franchise fee and future royalty payments, plus
attorney’s fees and expenses.307
Janai-Nebo raised nine issues on appeal, and the court of appeals over-
ruled each issue because Janai-Nebo failed to cite supporting legal au-
thority, offer any argument, or identify relevant portions of the appellate
record.308 Notably, the court of appeals emphasized that there is only one
method to calculate attorney’s fees—the “traditional” method—with the
lodestar method merely being a shorthand version of the traditional
method.309 It also noted there was “no rule that attorney’s fees cannot be
more than actual damages.”310
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Franchisors sometimes amend long-term franchise agreements during
their term for the purpose of having the franchisee sign an updated ver-
sion of the franchise agreement—however, franchisors must be sure to
satisfy all conditions precedent to the new agreement, or they can find
themselves stuck in a contract quandary. In Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Odetallah,
the parties executed a franchise agreement in 2007 that provided a
twenty-year term.311 Two years later, the parties signed a renewal agree-
ment that purported to change the term to expire in 2019; the renewal
required the parties to enter into Pizza Inn’s newest version of its
franchise agreement.312
However, the parties never executed the newer franchise agreement
and instead continued their relationship under the original agreement.313
Pizza Inn filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit Odetallah
from continuing to operate his franchise past the 2019 expiration date in
the renewal agreement.314 Odetallah did not file an answer or appear at
304. Id. at *1–2.
305. Id. at *2.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at *3–13, *15.
309. Id. at *14.
310. Id. at *15.
311. Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Odetallah, No. 4:19-CV-856, 2020 WL 4677685, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
May 14, 2020) (discussed supra Section IV.A.1 regarding the unauthorized use of trade-
marks and common law claims).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *2.
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the injunction hearing, but the district court, nevertheless, denied Pizza
Inn’s request.315
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that
Pizza Inn could not show a substantial likelihood of success on its claims
for breach of contract and trademark infringement given the uncertainty
on which contract was operative.316 While Pizza Inn tried to argue the
renewal agreement set forth the expiration date of the franchise agree-
ment, the district court noted that at least one condition precedent to the
effectiveness of the renewal agreement had not been met—i.e., execution
of the new franchise agreement.317 Since the original franchise agreement
provided Odetallah a license to use Pizza Inn’s trademarks and it was not
clear that agreement had expired, the district court held Pizza Inn could
not show Odetallah’s license had expired and thus was not entitled to
injunctive relief.318
Franchisors who offer franchises in Texas should carefully consider us-
ing a different state law to govern their franchise agreements because it
can change the standard by which remedies, such as injunctive relief, are
measured. In JTH Tax LLC v. White, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas examined a franchisor’s request for a prelimi-
nary injunction under Virginia law, as called for in the franchise
agreements.319
JTH operated two tax preparation companies and executed franchise
agreements with White for operation of three separate locations.320 The
parties later executed a Mutual Termination Agreement for one of those
locations that included post-termination covenants, including a non-com-
pete and cessation of using the franchisor’s trademarks.321 Thereafter,
White opened a new tax preparation business in the same location cov-
ered by the termination, and JTH terminated the remaining franchise
agreements due to White’s operation of a competing business and failure
to pay past due fees.322
JTH then sought a preliminary injunction to order White to comply
with all of the post-termination covenants based on allegations that White
had retained customer lists and files, retained an operations manual, op-
erated a competing business, and used marks and advertising materials
that were confusingly similar to JTH’s protected trademarks.323 In exam-
ining the four elements for a preliminary injunction, the district court
concluded that JTH had shown a substantial likelihood of success that
315. Id. at *1–2.
316. Id. at *2–4.
317. Id. at *3.
318. Id. at *4.
319. JTH Tax LLC v. White, No. 6-20-CV-00140-ADA, 2020 WL 3843691, at *1–2, *2
n.1 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2020) (discussed supra Section II.B regarding choice-of-law issues
and Section IV.A.1 regarding unauthorized use of trademark).
320. Id. at *1.
321. Id.
322. Id. at *2.
323. Id. at *2–3.
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White had breached various post-termination obligations, and many of
the marks and advertising materials met the “digits of confusion” test to
constitute infringement.324
However, the district court declined to find that JTH had shown a sub-
stantial threat of irreparable injury because Virginia law, unlike Texas
law, did not provide a statutory basis to enforce a non-competition agree-
ment through injunctive relief.325 While many federal Texas cases have
held that a breach of a non-compete was the “epitome of irreparable in-
jury,”326 there is no equivalent Virginia case or statute, and JTH’s sole
declaration from a regional manager that merely echoed speculative as-
sertions from the pleadings about loss of customers and goodwill was
insufficient.327
The district court went on to examine the element of balancing the
hardships and noted that White would suffer more harm from an injunc-
tion than JTH would suffer without one.328 The district court reached this
conclusion because White was disabled, had no prior work outside of tax
preparation, and would be precluded from working in substantial por-
tions of Texas.329 However, the district court noted that had JTH made a
clear showing of loss of customers and goodwill, those harms would have
been considered greater than White’s potential hardship.330
Irreparable harm is often the most difficult element to prove when
seeking injunctive relief in Texas because a party must demonstrate harm
by independent proof, rather than speculation, that cannot be remedied
by money damages.331 In TIGI Linea Corp. v. Professional Products
Group, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
examined a motion for preliminary injunction that sought to enjoin the
termination of a supply and distribution agreement.332 TIGI Linea Corp.
(TIGI) manufactured hair care products and contracted with Professional
Products Group (PPG) to distribute and sell those products directly to
mass retailers and to distributors and wholesalers who supplied products
to mass retailers.333
On the same day, TIGI notified PPG that it was terminating the agree-
ment and filed suit against PPG for breach of contract based on its al-
324. Id. at *2–4.
325. Id. at *5.
326. Id. (quoting Brink’s Inc. v. Patrick, No. 3:14-CV-775-B, 2014 WL 2931824, at *7
(N.D. Tex. June 27, 2014)).
327. Id. at *5.
328. Id. at *7.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See Pruvit Ventures, Inc. v. Forevergreen Int’l LLC, No. 4:15-CV-571-ALM-CAN,
2015 WL 9876952, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2015), adopting report and recommendation,
No. 4:15-CV-571, 2016 WL 231160, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2016); Heil Trailer Int’l Co. v.
Kula, 542 F. App’x 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2013).
332. TIGI Linea Corp. v. Pro. Prods. Grp., LLC, No. 4:20-CV-087, 2020 WL 3154857, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. May 20, 2020), adopting report and recommendation, No. 4:19-CV-00840-
RWS-KPJ, 2020 WL 3130139, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 12, 2020).
333. Id.
2021] Franchise Law 111
leged failure to diligently develop and maintain distribution of the
products.334 PPG then filed suit against TIGI in Florida state court and
sought a preliminary injunction, which was ultimately removed to federal
court and consolidated with TIGI’s lawsuit.335
In reviewing PPG’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the district
court focused exclusively on the element of irreparable harm.336 PPG
filed a declaration in support of its motion three days before the hearing,
but the district court granted TIGI’s motion to strike when the statements
in the declaration were directly contradicted by witnesses at the injunc-
tion hearing.337 PPG argued it would be irreparably harmed without in-
junctive relief because TIGI had and would continue to harm PPG’s
goodwill and business relationships.338 However, PPG was unable to
identify any customer it lost or that planned to cancel its relationship with
PPG since the agreement had been terminated.339 The district court went
on to note that even if PPG had proven it had lost customers as a result,
that injury could be remedied by monetary damages and thus would pre-
clude injunctive relief.340
Finally, the district court examined the procedural history at length to
conclude that PPG substantially delayed seeking injunctive relief, which
demonstrated “no apparent urgency” and rebutted the presumption of
irreparable harm.341 Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended
that the request for injunctive relief be denied, and the district court
adopted the recommendations in a subsequent order.342
VIII. CONCLUSION
The 2020 Survey period included a healthy sampling of rulings on pro-
cedural issues, including judgments on the merits of franchise disputes, as
well as dismissals for lack of jurisdictional prerequisites. In Hegar and
Arruda, both courts ultimately concluded that they were duty-bound to
dismiss claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under respective
state and federal statutes.343 In Gigi’s Cupcakes, Kumon, and Butschek,
the courts applied the familiar “minimum contacts” analysis in holding
that each court lacked personal jurisdiction over some or all of the re-
spective defendants involved in each case and dismissed all claims against
334. Id. at *2, *4.
335. Id. at *2–3.
336. Id. at *4.
337. Id. at *3–4.
338. Id. at *4.
339. Id. at *5.
340. Id.
341. Id. at *7–8 (quoting Wireless Agents, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-
0094-D, 2006 WL 1540587, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2006)).
342. Id. at *9; TIGI, 2020 WL 3130139, at *1.
343. Hegar v. Mahindra USA, Inc., No. 03-18-00126-CV, 2020 WL 962415, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Austin Feb. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Arruda v. Curves Int’l, Inc., No. 6:20-CV-
00092-ADA, 2020 WL 4289380, at *9 (W.D. Tex. July 27, 2020), appeal filed, No. 20-50734
(5th Cir. 2020).
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those defendants.344 These cases serve as valuable reminders of the im-
portance of complying with jurisdictional prerequisites in pursuing a
claim, particularly in complex franchise disputes involving parties from
multiple states, mixtures of state and federal claims, and appeals from
administrative proceedings. While subject matter jurisdiction is indispen-
sable, White and FranLink also demonstrate how franchisors can use
franchise agreements as an opportunity to designate an appropriate fo-
rum and preferred choice of law at the inception of the franchise relation-
ship, potentially avoiding inconvenient forums and unfavorable state laws
in the event that a dispute arises.345
The cases in this Survey period involving default judgment and sum-
mary judgment emphasize the importance of appearing, contesting dis-
puted claims and defenses at an early stage in the litigation, and working
diligently to create a factual record that can survive an opposing summary
judgment motion. In Liquid Capital, the defendants failed to appear in
the lawsuit, raised no defenses to the franchisor’s claims, and had a six-
figure default judgment entered against them with interest accruing until
the date the judgment is satisfied.346 In Janai, the appellant raised nine
points of error on appeal and lost every single one; not only was the re-
cord on appeal too sparse to support the appellant’s own motion for sum-
mary judgment, but the conclusory allegations in the appellant’s briefing
to the trial court and the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals failed to create a
fact issue sufficient to survive the appellee’s cross-motion, resulting in a
substantial adverse judgment.347 By contrast, the appellant in Dulce was
able to utilize clever statutory interpretations and a well-developed fac-
tual record to persuade the Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals to re-
verse a trial court ruling in favor of a state taxing authority and instead
grant summary judgment in favor of the franchisor.348
While there are only a few cases focused on the termination or non-
renewal of a franchise relationship in this year’s Survey, they touch on
issues that frequently arise in franchise litigation. In Fire Protection, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas construed the Texas
Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers,
and Dealers Act to require a safety equipment manufacturer to repur-
344. Gigi’s Cupcakes, LLC v. 4 Box LLC, No. 3:17-CV-3009-B, 2020 WL 1064852, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2020); Kumon N. Am. Inc. v. Ngoc Vinh Nguyen, No. 14-18-00639-CV,
2020 WL 3527615, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem.
op.); JTH Tax, LLC v. Butschek, No. 6:20-CV-26, 2020 WL 5083523, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
3, 2020).
345. JTH Tax LLC v. White, No. 6-20-CV-00140-ADA, 2020 WL 3843691, at *5 (W.D.
Tex. July 8, 2020); FranLink, Inc. v. BACE Servs., Inc., No. 4:19-CV-04593, 2020 WL
6600017, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2020).
346. Liquid Cap. of Am. Corp. v. Effective Bus. Sols. Inc., No. 3:18-CV-3102-S-BH,
2020 WL 2950412, at *2, *11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2020), adopting report and recommenda-
tion, No. 3:18-CV-3102-S-BH, 2020 WL 2926471, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2020).
347. Janai v. Sanford Rose Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 05-18-01079-CV, 2020 WL 728428, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
348. Dulce Rests., LLC v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 07-19-00213-CV, 2020 WL
5755016, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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chase inventory from a dealer following the manufacturer’s termination
of the parties’ relationship.349 In Vonocom, the Fifth Dallas Court of Ap-
peals enforced provisions of a distribution agreement to prohibit a former
distributor from selling products on Amazon, despite the fact that the
relationship between AdvoCare and its distributor had already been ter-
minated.350 In Clairday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
strictly construed a renewal provision in an option contract to enable the
franchisor to decline to renew the agreement where the franchisee failed
to give notice of the renewal within the required time frame; the Fifth
Circuit specifically declined to relax the contract’s notice requirements
under the doctrine of equitable intervention after concluding that
Clairday would not suffer an unconscionable hardship from non-
renewal.351
The main takeaway from this year’s crop of franchise-related trade-
mark disputes is that injunctive relief is an extreme remedy, and it is ex-
tremely difficult to convince a court to grant a preliminary injunction on
the theory that a former franchisee is infringing a franchisor’s protected
trademarks, trade dress, or trade secrets. As demonstrated in Pro-
TradeNet, courts adjudicating intellectual property disputes have signifi-
cant flexibility to assess damages and other remedies to correct any
confusion caused by unlawful use of intellectual property, particularly af-
ter a dispositive ruling on the merits of the dispute.352 In contrast, the
courts in Odetallah, White, and Buttermilk each declined to grant prelimi-
nary injunctions for trademark holders after concluding that unresolved
factual disputes and the sufficiency of potential monetary damages
weighed decisively against injunctive relief at the inception of each
lawsuit.353
This year’s cases involving common law claims demonstrate the impor-
tance of contract formation and interpretation for resolving franchise dis-
putes. In Odetallah, the failure of the parties to sign a permanent
franchise agreement after a temporary renewal agreement lapsed proved
to be a decisive factor in whether the franchisor could recover on its
trademark claims.354 In contrast, the specificity of the renewal term in the
disputed development agreement in Clairday provided a clear basis for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to rule in favor of the
franchisor—where a contract is effectively formed and its terms are un-
349. Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc., No. 4:19-02162, 2019 WL
3766567, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2019).
350. Vonocom, Inc. v. AdvoCare Int’l, LP, No. 05-19-00610-CV, 2020 WL 1528496, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
351. Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday, 979 F.3d 1064, 1065–66 (5th Cir. 2020).
352. ProTradeNet, LLC v. Predictive Profiles, Inc., No. 6:18-CV-38-ADA, 2020 WL
5510732, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2020).
353. Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Odetallah, No. 4:19-CV-856, 2020 WL 4677685, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
May 14, 2020); JTH Tax LLC v. White, No. 6-20-CV-00140-ADA, 2020 WL 3843691, at *5
(W.D. Tex. July 8, 2020); Buttermilk Sky of TN LLC v. Bake Moore, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-
00327, 2020 WL 4673909, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2020).
354. Odetallah, 2020 WL 4677685, at *4.
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ambiguous, Texas courts are rarely receptive to excuses for breach.355
Likewise, in Janai, the plain language of the franchise agreement pro-
vided sufficient evidentiary support for the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals
to reject the franchisee’s claims and defenses as a matter of law.356 While
the most substantive statutory claims in this year’s grouping involved
trademark and trade secrets claims, Arruda and Dulce also demonstrate
the potential for less common statutes to arise in franchise disputes.357
While discussions of remedies are scattered throughout this year’s se-
lected opinions, the final section of this Article features particularly note-
worthy examples of courts considering claims for damages, injunctive
relief, or attorney’s fees. In Janai, the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals
awarded a range of damages and trial and appellate attorney’s fees fol-
lowing the franchisee’s meritless appeal, specifically noting that there was
no rule prohibiting an award of fees from surpassing a compensatory
damages award.358 As illustrated in Odetallah, White, and TIGI Linea,
Texas courts are loath to grant preliminary injunctive relief in the early
stages of litigation, particularly in a commercial dispute where the risk of
irreparable harm to the movant is somewhat tempered by the availability
of monetary damages.359
Collectively, these cases provide a useful snapshot of franchise law in
Texas over the past year while also elaborating upon the familiar judicial
trends discussed in prior iterations of this Survey. While no single case
portends a sea change, each contains valuable lessons and reminders for
practitioners at all levels of experience.
355. Clairday, 979 F.3d at 1066.
356. Janai v. Sanford Rose Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 05-18-01079-CV, 2020 WL 728428, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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(W.D. Tex. July 27, 2020), appeal filed, No. 20-50734 (5th Cir. 2020); Dulce Rests., LLC v.
Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 07-19-00213-CV, 2020 WL 5755016, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Sept. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
358. Janai, 2020 WL 728428, at *1, *15.
359. Odetallah, 2020 WL 4677685, at *4; JTH Tax LLC v. White, No. 6-20-CV-00140-
ADA, 2020 WL 3843691, at *5 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2020); TIGI Linea Corp. v. Pro. Prods.
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